| Field |
Value |
| Document ID |
HUB-SEC-001 |
| Pillar |
Data |
| Standard Alignment |
OWASP ASVS / ISO 27001 / UU PDP No. 27/2022 |
| Status |
Active / Synchronized with Codebase |
| Last Updated |
2026-11-21 |
| Source of Truth |
docs/SECURITY.md, docs/p3mdi-sso.md, supabase/migrations/20261024_secure_auth.sql through 20261130080000_kerapian_kamar_review.sql, src/utils/helpers.js, src/store/portal.js, src/lib/supabase.js, src/lib/livePhotoLocation.js, ops/p3mdi-sso/*.ts, ops/authentik/p3mdi_hub/permissions.py, google-apps-script/Code.gs, vercel.json, nginx.conf, .github/workflows/portal.yml, tests/security.test.mjs, tests/sql/*.sql |
Soedirman Hub transitioned in October 2026 from an unauthenticated client-trusted prototype to a fail-closed database-enforced platform.
- For the original October 2026 vulnerability remediation baseline (
C1–C4, H1–H4, M1–M7), see SECURITY.md.
- For the P3MDI Authentik OIDC pilot background and operational rollout notes, see p3mdi-sso.md.
This document defines the current end-to-end data classification, authentication architecture, RBAC/RLS matrix, privacy engineering controls, HTTP edge hardening, and CI security gates synchronized with all 39 SQL migrations.
| Classification |
Examples / Tables / Fields |
Protection Mechanism |
| Critical / Credentials & Secrets |
pin_hash, sessions.token_hash, P3MDI_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET, P3MDI_ACCOUNT_API_TOKEN, SUPABASE_SECRET_KEY, PORTAL_DEPLOY_KEY |
Bcrypt (gen_salt('bf', 8)); 32-byte tokens stored only as SHA-256 hashes; portal_private & core_cache revoked from anon/authenticated; Deno broker & CI secrets isolated outside browser bundle; Gitleaks commit scan. |
| Restricted Personal Data (UU PDP) |
serdik.telepon, serdik.email, serdik.alamat, serdik.tanggal_lahir; pendampingan_cases/notes; daily_condition_entries; izin_bermalam_checkins selfie + lat/lng; info_digital_screenshots |
Direct column SELECT revoked on public.serdik; masked in portal_serdik_directory; Pendampingan & Daily Condition locked in portal_private with strict actor scope; IB selfies & coords purged 168h after ends_at; Info Digital strips JPEG EXIF APPn/COM markers & breaks reporter-report linkage. |
| Confidential Operational Data |
absensi_apel, absensi_lock, korps_reports, pengasuh_reports, kamar_submissions / kamar_reviews, saran (WBS), live_attendance_photos, sso_audit |
Enforced via RLS policies reading portal_private.current_session() or SECURITY DEFINER RPCs; anonymous saran entries invisible even to submitter after INSERT; photo GPS accuracy capped <= 100 m, fix age <= 15 s. |
| Internal Cohort Directory & Metadata |
serdik (id, nosis, nama, grup, elemen, asal_institusi, role), pengasuh, rundown_harian, commander_intents, rabuan_sessions, korps_bidang |
Exposed only to active sessions (portal_private.current_session()) or masked directory view (portal_serdik_directory). |
Soedirman Hub supports two server-verified login paths that both terminate in the same 12-hour opaque session token (x-portal-token, 64 lowercase hex characters = 32 random bytes, SHA-256 hashed in portal_private.sessions):
- NOSIS / NRP + 6-Digit PIN (
portal_login):
- Verifies bcrypt
pin_hash inside Postgres (pgcrypto). If the user is unknown, performs a dummy crypt(..., gen_salt('bf', 8)) check to equalize timing.
- Rejects archived/deactivated P3MDI Core members (
core_is_active = false, migration 20261129).
- Enforces sliding 15-minute brute-force lockouts inside
portal_private.login_attempts: 5 failed attempts per user_type:code | client_ip (cf-connecting-ip, IPv6 /64 masked) and 50 failed attempts per client IP. Only super_admin can clear locks via portal_admin_unlock_login.
- Enforces PIN strength server-side (
portal_private.is_weak_pin) and client-side (validateNewPin in src/utils/helpers.js): rejects non-6-digit strings, repeated digits (000000), ascending/descending sequences, and weak lists (123456, 654321, 012345, 543210, 123123, 112233, 121212). Changing PIN invalidates all other active sessions (token_hash <> v_token_hash).
- P3MDI Authentik OIDC PKCE (
ops/p3mdi-sso/ + portal_login_p3mdi):
- Browser performs PKCE
S256 (code_verifier, state, nonce) against https://auth.p3mdi.id/application/o/authorize/.
- Deno SSO broker exchanges
code + client_secret + verifier at /application/o/token/, cryptographically verifies id_token (RS256 against remote JWKS, issuer, aud/azp, nonce, maxTokenAge: 5 minutes), resolves Authentik PK, and calls portal_login_p3mdi via service_role.
- Authentik Django extension
ops/authentik/p3mdi_hub/permissions.py automatically grants soedirman-hub-sso-admin Guardian object permissions solely for internal, non-superuser accounts inside group Soedirman Hub Serdik.
- Onboarding Session Boundary (
20261116 & 20261126):
portal_private.session_identity() resolves users with must_change_pin = true, permitting only portal_me, portal_logout, and /api/sso/setup (portal_setup_*).
portal_private.current_session() adds WHERE NOT s.must_change_pin, failing closed for every RLS policy and operational RPC until onboarding finishes (portal_setup_finish).
- Fresh OIDC Step-Up Confirmation (
20261127):
- Sensitive SSO mutations (
PATCH /api/sso/profile, DELETE /api/sso/link, /api/sso/security password change, /api/sso/sessions, /api/sso/accounts mutations & password resets) require a 5-minute portal_private.sso_confirmations record created only after a prompt=login&max_age=0 OIDC callback verified within [now - 300s, now + 30s] for the same linked user.
| Role Key |
Label |
Operational Scope & Privileges |
super_admin |
Super Admin |
Full read/write across operational modules, master data CRUD (AdminConsoleView), category/audit management, IB retention control, login unlock, PIN/SSO admin management, and AdminRoleSwitcher preview. |
komandan_batch |
Komandan Batch |
Batch-wide read (canViewAll), Danbatch report, Commander's Intent authoring, batch Korps & Pengasuh finalization, read-only AdminConsoleView (no write/SSO admin actions), Dokumentasi read-only. |
kabid_sdm |
Kabid SDM |
Batch attendance monitoring, rundown_harian edit, notulensi_apel write, saran triage (manageSaran), masked PII read in portal_serdik_directory. |
kabid_ops |
Kabid Ops |
Access to /operasional, calendar/live-photo management (canEditCalendar, canManageLivePhotoAttendance), PAM/package oversight, batch attendance monitoring, rundown_harian edit. |
komandan_grup |
Komandan Grup |
Group-scoped attendance input, absensi_lock verification/unlock (verifyAbsensi), package review, scoped live photo review, kerapian-kamar & pendampingan (including designated Wadan Grup deputy accounts), saran triage, scoped telephone access. |
komandan_elemen |
Komandan Elemen |
Element-scoped attendance input restricted to time windows (05:00-08:00 / 19:00-22:00 WIB + PRESENSI_OPEN_BEFORE_HOURS = 2h before apel, blocked once absensi_lock.locked = true), scoped package review, scoped kerapian-kamar read. |
poldik |
Poldik |
Poldik discipline workspace (/poldik), batch attendance read, PAM/package review, rundown_harian edit, notulensi_apel write. |
penerangan |
Penerangan & Dokumentasi |
Legacy dokumentasi merged here (20261026). Exclusive non-admin upload/gallery view (/dokumentasi, /dokumentasi/upload, /dokumentasi/laporan-harian/cetak), article approval (canAccArtikel), Commander's Intent co-management, notulensi_apel write, GAS Drive upload. |
lemusdik |
Lemusdik |
Manages saran / Kotak Aspirasi status & responses (manageSaran). |
pengasuh |
Pengasuh / Pelatih |
Batch attendance read, Danbatch report, notulensi_apel write/delete, TNI instructor reporting (PengasuhReportsWorkspace), supervising batch matrix (20261130070000), group-scoped kerapian-kamar & pendampingan. |
serdik |
Serdik |
Personal attendance summary/streak (AbsensiPribadi), daily rundown, learning, peer appreciation (sosiometri), WBS/aspirasi submission, PAM/IB check-in, Info Digital anonymous reporting (5/day quota), self-service SSO profile. |
portal_private.scoped_grants allows authorized issuers (super_admin, komandan_batch, komandan_grup, komandan_elemen, kabid_ops, kabid_sdm, pengasuh where may_delegate_duty permits) to issue time-bounded (starts_at < ends_at, subject <> issuer) kasi or pic duties over specific unit/grup/elemen/bidang scopes via portal_scoped_duties(), dynamically extending Korps report/proker and Kerapian Kamar (kasi) review access without elevating base roles.
- Only sessions whose real role is
super_admin (verified inside Postgres portal_switch_role) can write portal_private.sessions.preview_role.
effective_role() invariant: Any komandan_batch, kabid_*, or serdik record with stale or tampered preview_role resolves strictly to p_real_role. Switching to super_admin is disallowed as a preview target (preview_role clears to NULL).
- Frontend stores preview metadata strictly in
sessionStorage['soedirman_admin_role_preview_v1'] (never localStorage), blocks role switching in demo mode, and immediately routes away from restricted tabs via getFallbackRouteForUser() + reloads data.
| Data Domain |
Read (SELECT) Gate |
Write / Mutate Gate |
Key Privacy / Fail-Closed Nuances |
serdik & portal_serdik_directory |
Masked columns via portal_serdik_directory (security_barrier = true, security_invoker = false) |
super_admin only (updateSerdik routes Core-owned fields through /api/sso/core) |
Critical invariant: portal_serdik_directory MUST keep security_invoker = false and match owner with public.serdik; setting security_invoker = true breaks all syncs with HTTP 42501. |
absensi_apel & absensi_lock |
Serdik reads own rows only; command/ops/pengasuh/poldik read all (can_view_all_absensi()) |
Insert/Update by super_admin, komandan_grup (own group), komandan_elemen (own group+elemen, open WIB window & unlocked) |
Post-lock corrections require portal_correct_attendance RPC (komandan_grup / super_admin). |
live_attendance_photos |
Owner, command review scope (can_review_scoped_photo), kabid_ops, komandan_batch, super_admin |
Owner insert/upsert matching id = tanggal__sessionKey__owner_code |
Metadata projection strips photoUrl, gps, locationName. GPS constraint enforces accuracy <= 100 m & fix_age_ms <= 15000 ms. |
saran (WBS & Aspirasi) |
super_admin, komandan_batch, lemusdik, kabid_sdm, komandan_grup; reporters see own non-anonymous only (NOT is_anonim) |
Any active session INSERT (return=minimal); UPDATE by manageSaran roles |
Frontend sends INSERT without ON CONFLICT so anonymous submitters cannot probe rows via SELECT. |
dokumentasi & commander_intents |
Docs: penerangan, komandan_batch, super_admin; Intents: all active sessions |
Docs: penerangan (delete own) / super_admin; Intents: komandan_batch, super_admin, penerangan |
stamp_commander_intent trigger prevents author spoofing. |
korps_* & pengasuh_* |
Denied to anon/authenticated direct REST; served via SECURITY DEFINER RPCs |
Scope-checked per bidang / tingkat / unit_id + optimistic version lock |
Batch view opened to pengasuh via 20261130070000 for supervisory visibility. |
portal_private.* (pendampingan, daily_condition, info_digital, kamar_*, ib_*, sessions, sso_*) |
Zero direct REST access (REVOKE ALL ... FROM PUBLIC, anon, authenticated) |
Exclusively through audited SECURITY DEFINER RPCs checking current_session() |
Eliminates accidental PostgREST data leakage even if a schema cache reload occurs. |
- IB Selfie & Coordinate Minimization & Auto-Purge (
20261130020000):
izin_bermalam_checkins stores coarse coordinates (client rounds GPS coordinates) and is governed by portal_ib_retention.
- When enabled in
AdminConsoleView (Data & Privasi -> IbRetentionPanel), run_ib_retention automatically nulls latitude, longitude, and foto_selfie_url and stamps evidence_removed_at once an IB period’s ends_at + 168 hours (7 days) elapses—preserving attendance/compliance audit metadata. Retention logs append to ib_retention_history.
- Info Digital Exif Stripping & Reporter Anonymity (
20261130060000):
portal_info_digital_clean_jpeg(bytea) strips JPEG APP1..APP15 (0xFFE1–0xFFEF) and COM (0xFFFE) segments inside PostgreSQL before storing evidence (<= 2.1 MB), eradicating device EXIF GPS/camera metadata.
- Daily quota (
5/day WIB) tracks reporter_nosis solely in info_digital_quota with no foreign key or timestamp correlation to info_digital_reports.
- Photo GPS Anti-Spoof Validation (
src/lib/livePhotoLocation.js & 20261130030000):
- Client & server require valid GPS fix (
accuracy <= 100 m, 0 <= fix_age_ms <= 15000), detect impossible movement jumps / repeated identical precise coordinates (assessPhotoLocation), and optionally reverse-geocode via a same-origin proxy (VITE_NOMINATIM_REVERSE_URL) without transmitting high-precision coordinates to public views (metadata strips gps & locationName).
- Full Client Cache & IndexedDB Purge on Logout (
src/store/portal.js):
logoutUser() invokes purgeBrowserCaches(), removing STORAGE_KEY, p3md_gmaps_api_key, legacy/module localStorage keys, all soedirman-outbox-v1:* entries, ADMIN_ROLE_PREVIEW_KEY, and closing/clearing IndexedDB (soedirman-attendance-photos).
Both deployment targets enforce identical security headers (using always in nginx.conf):
X-Frame-Options: DENY
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains
Permissions-Policy: camera=(self), microphone=(), geolocation=(self), payment=() (allows camera & GPS for self-origin attendance/IB while blocking microphone & payments)
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' https://maps.googleapis.com https://maps.gstatic.com; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self' data: blob: https:; connect-src 'self' https://*.supabase.co https://script.google.com https://script.googleusercontent.com https://maps.googleapis.com https://maps.gstatic.com https://mapsresources-pa.googleapis.com https://streetviewpixels-pa.googleapis.com; worker-src 'self' blob:; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'
- Enforces strict
Origin equality (P3MDI_HUB_ORIGIN) on all mutating HTTP requests (!= GET) and rejects mismatched Origin headers with HTTP 403.
- Traefik middleware (
soedirman-hub-sso-body) caps request bodies at 8192 bytes.
- Every broker response sends
Cache-Control: no-store and Vary: Origin.
npm audit --audit-level=high blocks High/Critical dependency vulnerabilities.
ghcr.io/gitleaks/gitleaks (pinned digest, full Git history git --redact --log-opts=HEAD .) blocks leaked credentials.
tests/security.test.mjs asserts fail-closed env configuration, GAS HTTPS host allowlist, removal of legacy offline tokens/backdoors (LOCAL_STANDALONE_USERS, isOfflineToken, hardcoded URLs), RLS checks across operational migrations, and portal_serdik_directory security_invoker = false.
| Risk |
Current Status / Mitigation |
Target Remediation |
| Google Drive Media Storage Governance |
google-apps-script/Code.gs validates portal_me + role gate, enforces <= 8 MB image MIME allowlist, and still sets uploaded files to ANYONE_WITH_LINK (VIEW) inside Drive. kerapian_kamar (kamar_submission_media) & dokumentasi store resulting URLs. |
Migrate binary evidence (dokumentasi, sosiometri, live_attendance_photos, kamar_submission_media) to private Supabase Storage buckets accessed exclusively via short-lived signed URLs (createSignedUrl), deprecating Code.gs and ANYONE_WITH_LINK sharing (detailed plan in SECURITY.md). |
| Dual Client/SQL State on Legacy Modules |
izin_keluar, catatan_disiplin (poldikService.js), and operasionalService.js tables exist in migrations 20261116_perizinan_ib.sql / 20261116_poldik_operasional.sql with legacy auth.uid() policies while active Vue views read/write localStorage. |
Migrate izin_keluar, poldik, and operasional to SECURITY DEFINER RPCs backed by portal_private.current_session() (mirroring 20261130020000_ib_retention.sql & 20261130050000_pendampingan.sql). |
| Client-Entered Google Maps API Key |
PetaPersebaranView.vue permits users to save a Maps JS key in localStorage (p3md_gmaps_api_key). |
Replace with HTTP-referrer-restricted build-time key or open-source Leaflet tiles to remove localStorage key storage. |
| Multi-User Shared Device Caching |
While logout wipes localStorage + IndexedDB, abrupt browser close leaves p3md_portal_session_v1 valid for up to 12 hours. |
Users on shared cohort terminals must click Logout; consider configurable idle timeout lock in future release. |